Abstract. We introduce a new cryptosystem with trapdoor decryption based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in the class group of the non-maximal imaginary quadratic order QA,, where A, = Aq2, A square-free and q prime. The trapdoor information is the conductor q. Knowledge of this trapdoor information enables one to switch to and from the class group of the maximal order U A , where the representatives of the ideal classes have smaller coefficients. Thus, the decryption procedure may be performed in the class group of Q A rather than in the class group of the public OA,, which is much more efficient. We show that inverting our proposed cryptosystem is computationally equivalent to factoring the non-fundamental discriminant A,, which is intractable for a suitable choice of A and q. We also describe how signature schemes in U A , may be set up using this trapdoor information. Furthermore, we illustrate how one may embed key escrow capability into classical imaginary quadratic field cryptosystems.
Introduction
Since Diffie and Hellman's introduction of public key cryptography in [9] a variety of encryption and signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) have been proposed [ll, 23,221. Due to the nature of cryptosystems based on the DLP, it is possible to replace the group Z / p Z * in the classical protocols by other finite Abelian groups in which the DLP is more intractable or the implementation yields better performance. Popular examples are the group of points on elliptic curves [20, 15] , the divisor class group of hyperelliptic curves [16] , the group Z / n Z * , where n is the product of two large primes [19] , and the class group of imaginary quadratic fields [5, 18] .
In this work we will focus on discrete log cryptosystems based on the class group of non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. This is a slight, but in practice very important generalization of [5, 18] , where only the class group of the imaginary quadratic field, i.e., the class group of the maximal order was considered. It is known that the computation of discrete logarithms in the class group of an imaginary quadratic order can be used to factor the corresponding discriminant [5, 25] . Thus, the inversion of these cryptosystems is at least as difficult as factoring. On the other hand, there is no good algorithm known t o compute discrete logs in the class group of the maximal order if only the factorization of the discriminant is known. Therefore, these cryptosystems are very interesting from a theoretical point of view. While the best algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in class groups [ 12,3] have sub-exponential complexity, they are still too inefficient for large discriminants. However, the cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms in class groups have not yet gained very much attention in practice, because the known implementations are still too inefficient. A step towards practical cryptosystems based on imaginary quadratic class groups is presented in this article. We introduce a trapdoor variation of this type of cryptosystem which significantly improves the decryption procedure. The trapdoor information is the factorization of the non-fundamental discriminant Aq = Aq2, where A is square-free and q is prime. Knowledge of the conductor q enables one to switch to the class group of the maximal order and back. Thus, the key-owner may take advantage of the shortcut via the maximal order when decrypting. This is somewhat similar t o the application of the Chinese remainder theorem when generating RSA signatures.
However, the relative speedup is much higher in our proposed system.
If an attacker knows the factorization of the discriminant Aq = Aq2, our system is no longer secure, since he is able to switch t o the class group of the maximal order O A where he may easily attack the system using the sub-exponential algorithms from [12, 3] . Hence, breaking our scheme is %nly7' equivalent to factoring the discriminant, unless A is chosen sufficiently large.
Using the knowledge of the factorization of Aq, one may compute the order of the group of equivalence classes of C?A, via the maximal order. This enables signature schemes in the class group of OA, to be set up. Knowledge of the conductor also enables one to set up a key escrow system by providing a nonmaximal order to users of a classical imaginary quadratic field cryptosystem.
The paper is organized as follows: We first briefly discuss the relation between the maximal and non-maximal orders in imaginary quadratic number fields. We give algorithms t o switch t o and from the class group of the non-maximal order to the class group of the maximal order and explain the parameter setup for the new scheme. The new scheme is discussed in terms of security; this will include a proof that breaking our scheme is computationally equivalent to factoring the non-fundamental discriminant Aq = Aq2 . We also present run time statistics for various parameter sizes which illustrate the efficiency of our new scheme. Finally, we discuss how signature schemes and a key escrow system may be set up using class groups of non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders.
Orders in imaginary quadratic number fields
Basic notions of imaginary quadratic fields and orders can be found in [2], [13] or [7] . For a more complete treatment, of the relationship between maximal and non-maximal orders we refer to [8] .
Let A be any non-square negative integer congruent to 0 or 1 modulo 4. The quadratic order of discriminant A is defined as
The maximal order of the quadratic field Q(@) will be denoted by UA,, and the non-maximal order with conductor f will be denoted by U d f , where Af = f 2 A l . If the conductor is prime, we will denote it by q rather than f , and the corresponding non-maximal order will be denoted by U A , . All primitive ideals of an order U A will be presented in standard representation: Furthermore, we know that the norm of ideals prime to the conductor is multiplicative, as it is for ideals in the maximal order. Proof. See [8, Lemma 7.14, page 1401.
0
The set of invertible ideals of On, , i.e., the ideals which are prime to f , will be denoted by Zd, (f). Then the above propositions show that they form a subgroup of Tat. Inside this subgroup we have a smaller subgroup, the principal ideals of Onf which are prime to f . This subgroup is denoted by PA, (f). 
and N(a) = Id(%).
inverse of this map is 9-l : a I+ aOA,.
Proof. See [8, Proposition 7.20, page 1441.
The next proposition shows that if we are only concerned with equivalence classes of ideals, then the primality condition in Proposition 6 does not impose an insurmountable obstacle.
Proposition 7.
Let OA be an order in an imaginary quadratic field. Given a nonzero integer f, then every ideal class in Cl(A) contains an OA-ideal preme to f.
Proof. See [8, Corollary 7.17, page 1421.
0
We will restrict ourselves to the case where the conductor is prime in our cryptosystem. To implement our scheme, we will need constructive versions of Proposition 6 and 7. Therefore, we will give simple algorithms for computing an OA-ideal prime to the conductor q and for switching from I d l to 14, and back.
Algorithm 1 (FindIdealPrimeTo).
Input: A primitive OA-ideal a = ( a , b) and a prime q Output: 
We now give algorithms for switching from the set of invertible ideals of the maximal order I d l to the set of invertible ideals of the non-maximal order ZA, and back. These algorithms will be the key ingredients of our proposed scheme, which is discussed in more detail in Section 3. Our proposed cryptosystem in Section 3 is constructed over A, = A1q2, where q is a prime integer. In this case, the condition for a reduced ideal to be prime to the conductor q is given by the following Lemma. It is important to note that the isomorphism cp is between the ideal groups ZA, ( q ) and ZA, (q), and unfortunately not the class groups. If, for 8,B E ZA, ( q ) we have B -23, it is not necessarily true that cp Proof. This follows from the exact sequence:
Algorithm 2 (GoToNonMaxOrder
Cl(A,) -+ C l ( A ) -+ I (see [21, Theorem 12.9, p. 821).
0
We will make use of the following lemma in our proposed cryptosystem:
cp-'(a)" -cp-'(a") .
Proof. Use the fact that 'p is an isomorphism between ideal groups and combine this with Theorem 9. non-fundamental discriminant A, OA,-ideal g (base ideal) OA,-ideal a (public key) By these two Lemmas and Proposition 6 there is a one-to-one correspondence between reduced ideals in CZ(A,) and Cl(A1) whose norms are smaller than Finally, we give the relationship between the class numbers h(A1) and h ( A f ) . 
System setup
The setup of the proposed cryptosystem is very simple. Alice chooses a large prime p . If p G 3 (mod 4) then A = -p , else A = -4p. Obviously A is a fundamental discriminant. Next she chooses another large prime q and computes the non-fundamental discriminant A, = Aq2, i.e., q will be the conductor of the publicly available non-maximal order On,.
Alice now chooses any prime OA,-ideal g = (9, b g ) . This may be done by selecting a prime g where ( A q / g ) = 1 and computing b,, i.e., a square-root of Aq mod 49 using Shanks' probabilistic algorithm RESSOL. A version of RESSOL with expected run time O ((1og g ) 3 
where 41 and 9 2 are reduced ideals in ZA, and 91 = gk, 9 2 = mak .
Note that the encryption is carried out entirely in the class group of the nonmaximal order, and that all ideal arithmetic is performed with reduced ideals.
Furthermore, we require N ( m ) < d m in order to uniquely decrypt the message m (see Lemma 12).
Decryption
The decryption algorithm is similar to ElGamal decryption, but here we make use of our trapdoor information, namely the factorization of A,. All ideal arithmetic is done with reduced ideals in the maximal order as opposed to the non-maximal order.
Algorithm 4 (Decrypt).

Input:
The ciphertext ek (m, k) = (91,92), 91,92 E ZA,, the conductor q Output: m, the C3ap-ideal containing the embedded plaintext.
1. 2Jl =GoToMaxOrder(g1,q).
2. 592 =GoToMaxOrder(q2,q).
m =GoToNonMaxOrder(rn, 4).
RETURN(m)
3. m = 92(921p)-1.
Proof (Correctness). By definition, we have 91 = cp-l(q1) and 592 = (p-'(qa).
From Lemma 10 it follows that g2 = cp-'(mak)
and Thus, we have
Since m was selected such that N(m) < m, we can uniquely decrypt 0 (p((3n) = m, from Lemma 12.
Security of the proposed cryptosystem
The main advantage of this protocol over an ElGamal protocol using only arithmetic in the non-maximal order is that decryption is performed in the maximal order, where the coefficients in the ideal representations are significantly smaller than those of the non-maximal order. We will now show that this computational advantage does not incur any loss in security. On the other hand, if one is able to factor the non-fundamental discriminant A, = Aq2 he may switch to the maximal order OA and solve the discrete logarithm problem in Cl(A) which is assumed to be possible. Thus, the computation 0 of discrete logs in Cl(A,) can be reduced to factoring A, = Aq2.
Remark that the assumption of being able to solve the discrete logarithm problem in Cl(A) is not unrealistic, since we choose A small to speed up the computations. Note furthermore that unlike the case of factoring of polynomials over finite fields (see, for example, [7, Section 3.4]), no algorithm is known which computes the "square-free factorization" of an integer substantially easier than the complete factorization.
Parameter Sizes
Since breaking our proposed scheme is equivalent to factoring the public nonfundamental discriminant A,, we have t o choose the parameters A , q such that factoring A, = Aq2 is infeasible. Considering this situation yields the following requirements:
-A, has t o be large enough that it can't be factored with O(A1/6+0(') 1-methods, see e.g. [24] curve method [17] sieve [6] h(A) is possible.
-A and q have to be large enough that they can't be found with the elliptic -A, has to be large enough that it can't be factored with the number field -(signature setup only) A has to be small enough that the computation of The elliptic curve method has been used to find factors of up to 156 bits length. Hence, we must select A,q > 2170 to ensure that an adversary cannot factor A,. If A < 2216, the DL problem in Cl(A) can be solved in reasonable time by anyone who knows the factorization of A, [14] , so selecting A > 2216 may add an even greater level of security to our scheme.
Run-Time Statistics
In order to demonstrate the improved efficiency of our trapdoor decryption, we implemented our scheme using the LiDIA library [l]. It should be emphasized here that our implementation was not optimized for cryptographic purposes ~ it is only intended to provide a comparison between decrypting in the non-maximal order and using our trapdoor decryption. For five different non-maximal orders of various sizes, we have computed the average run time for encryption, classical decryption, and our trapdoor decryption of fifty randomly selected messages using randomly selected exponents. The results of these computations can be found in Table 1 . Dec denotes the average time for classical decryption and Dec, denotes the average time for the trapdoor decryption. The encryption is identical in both schemes, and the average time is denoted by Enc. We also give the run time for RSA decryption (DecR) using a modulus of the same size as A,. All run times are given in CPU seconds on a 160 hlz SPARC-ultra machine. As expected, our results clearly demonstrate an improvement in the decryption time. This is due to the fact that almost all of the arithmetic is carried out with reduced ideals in the maximal order. Hence, the operands are of size approximately m, rather than as in the case where the trapdoor in-formation is not used. Our decryption method is still not as fast as that of RSA, but it is a t least comparable.
Further applications
It is in principal possible to use knowledge of the factorization of A, to set up ElGamal-style and RSA-style signature schemes. If we select the fundamental discriminant A such that computing h ( A ) is feasible, then we can use the following corollary of Theorem 13 to compute h(A,) at very little extra cost. Unfortunately, these signature schemes have the disadvantage that the signature generation and verification both take place in the non-maximal order, so no extra efficiency is gained using this approach. Also, the security of these schemes is also computationally equivalent to factoring, so they probably have no significant advantages over regular ElGamal or RSA signature schemes.
An interesting side-effect of our scheme is that it is possible t o set up a key escrow cryptosystem using the classical imaginary quadratic field cryptosystem. Instead of a fundamental discriminant, the key provider simply issues a nonfundamcntal discriminant of which only he knows the conductor to the users of the protocol. The users have no way of knowing that they are encrypting and decrypting in a non-maximal order, but the key provider can easily read their messages by solving the DLP in the maximal order. Hence it is important for any users of such protocols to ensure that they only use fundamental discriminants, and t o have their key provider prove that the discriminant he issues is indeed fundamental. This could be done as follows:
Assume that Bob wants t o prove t o Alice that A is squarefree. Remark that if A and 4( A ) are coprime, then A is squarefree. Alice chooses a random integer 2, computes y = zA and sends it to Bob. If A and 4(A) are indeed coprime, then Bob can compute an integer e such that e . A 1 (mod 4(A)) using the extended Euclidean algorithm. So Bob computes z = ye and sends it to Alice. Alice compares z and z ; if they are not equal, Alice rejects A. If 4 is not squarefree, then Bob can cheat with probability at most l / q , where q2 I A. Thus after several iterations without rejecting, Alice will believe that A and @(A) are coprime, and hence 4 is squarefree.
Note that this method fails to prove squarefreeness for integers of the form pq where q I ( p -l), for example. However, a key provider can easily select a squarefree discriminant A coprime to 4(A) which he can prove is squarefree using the protocol given above.
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